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INTRODUCTION: IN THE BEGINNING
When as a young boy I was asked what I wanted to be later, unlike many others of
my age I never chose to be a fireman or a truck driver. For years, my answer was: I
want to be an Englishman. I guess I read too many books about the history of the
British Empire at too young an age. Since then I have read a lot more, but I do still see
myself as an anglophile (even though successive British governments do their best to
dissuade me). I feel absolutely no Schadenfreude over Brexit therefore. Brexit is bad
news for the EU and a disaster for the UK. In the area of foreign policy and defence
that I will address here, the consequences will be far-reaching and the cost very high,
for both Brussels and London.
In the beginning, however, in the immediate aftermath of World War Two, the UK
was a strong proponent of European cooperation. None other than Winston
Churchill, in his 1946 speech at the University of Zürich, stated that “We must build
a kind of United States of Europe”. That was the task the UK saw – for the others. For
itself, the UK saw a different role.
Financially and economically exhausted by World War Two, knowing that the Empire
was entering its final stage (India, the jewel in the crown, gained independence in
1947), Britain fundamentally changed its grand strategy. Instead of an independent
global role, the UK opted for the part of permanent (and, certainly its own eyes,
essential) ally of the US. The war had seen the start of the Anglo-American “special
relationship”. The UK had started out as the dominant partner, but as the US
mobilised its enormous war potential, the relationship had turned around. After the
war, the US was left as the only Western superpower, with Britain a distant second
(even though it acquired the atomic bomb). But while many in the US were initially
inclined to demobilize and let Europe take care of its own defence, Britain played a
key role in convincing the Americans of the need of a permanent transatlantic
alliance, NATO, as a continuation of the war-time alliance.
The UK did engage in European cooperation. In 1947 it signed an alliance with France,
the Treaty of Dunkirk, followed the next year by the Treaty of Brussels with France
and the Benelux Countries. Britain’s view of the latter was largely shaped however
by the fact that the US had put a European initiative as a precondition to start the
secret talks with Canada and the UK that would lead to the creation of NATO (in
1949). In the end, the UK remained outside the main track of European integration:
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951), the failed European Defence
Community (EDC,1954), and the European Economic Community (EEC, 1957) that
grew out of that failure. It did join the Western European Union (WEU, 1954) that
succeeded to the Brussels Treaty and added West Germany and Italy as members,
but that organisation quickly became an empty shell as NATO and the EEC took off.2
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circle. But a closer look reveals that the choice for Brexit actually is a fundamental
break with past British strategy. In the 1940s, the UK sought a permanent transat-
lantic alliance, in order to guarantee permanent American involvement – in the
security of Europe. Because it knew very well that a strong and secure Europe was a
prerequisite for a strong and secure Britain. Hence London was in favour of cooper-
ation between the other states of western Europe, even though at that time it did
not join their main project itself. In the area of defence, the UK did opt for an Atlantic
rather than a European-only strategy. But in 1945-1955 the UK did not distance itself
from Europe. It had just fought a major war to liberate Europe from the Nazis.
That is a completely different attitude to Europe than the anti-European stance of
the core Brexiteers who in June 2016 forced Brexit upon the UK.3
ILLUSIONS
At times it almost appears as if the Brexiteers would want the EU to collapse, just to
prove that they were right. They need proof, because so far all they have managed
to create is uncertainty. Not even those who shouted the loudest in favour of Brexit
actually expected to win the referendum, so there was no plan. A year and a half later
things are not much clearer.
One answer is fatalism. At a seminar, I heard a Conservative MP confess, when asked
what the desired end-state of the Brexit negotiations was, that he had no idea where
the UK wanted to land, but that in any case there was no alternative now but to see
it through, since “the people have spoken”. Others try to mask their fear or ignorance
with bravura and, like Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, talk about a “glorious future”.
But I am very much afraid, for the UK, that all the talk about “global Britain” as an
independent actor in world politics is nothing but hubris. The mistake that the
Brexiteers are making is to assume that they can return to the status quo ante, and
that there are many options available for British grand strategy.
The reality is that Britain’s strategic options have been severely limited ever since the
end of World War Two. Already during the Greek civil war (1946-1949) London was
forced to ask Washington to take over its military commitments in the country (in
support of the non-communist camp), because it simply no longer had the means to
carry on. This is exactly why after the end of the war the UK did not opt for an
independent grand strategy, but for the role of permanent “deputy sheriff” of the
US. The 1956 Suez crisis was the last gasp for Britain, and France, as independent
powers. When these countries militarily occupied the canal zone, they were immedi-
ately called back by the US, and duly retreated.
Many Brexiteers see the Commonwealth as Britain’s natural constituency that can
support its global role, but that is a very loose grouping of countries. Or they refer to
the “Anglosphere”, but even countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand have
a much more diverse population than 70 years ago and a much looser emotional link
with the UK. The Queen may still be the Head of State, but when push comes to
shove, they will choose the national interest over the British legacy. Canada is
economically dependent on the US, Australia on China, and for their security both
look to America. Pretending that even these key members of the “Anglosphere”, let
alone the Commonwealth as such, can replace the EU in British trade and foreign
policy, is not very realistic.
Of course, the UK still is an important country. But it is not a great power – not
anymore. Britain enjoys a strong diplomatic position. It has a permanent seat on the
UN Security Council and is a member of the G7, the club of the world’s seven biggest
economies, but the same applies to France, and Canada and Italy are members of the4
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politics by itself. The players that matter are countries the size of a continent, or
countries that have grouped together to achieve that size: the US, China, Russia, and
the EU. This holds true in the military domain too. The UK entered World War Two
with a Royal navy of over 1400 ships. Today it counts less than a hundred. Both in
absolute and in relative terms (compared to other major actors) the UK doesn’t even
come close to the power that it had even in 1945.
Furthermore, the centre of gravity of the world system is shifting to Asia, where even
the EU as a whole has difficulties being heard. Nobody in Asia is waiting for new
initiatives from a single European country. Yes indeed, China has already stated its
willingness to negotiate a new bilateral trade agreement with the UK once Brexit
becomes effective, but on different terms than those that apply to China and the EU.
Read: on terms that are more advantageous to Beijing.
The conclusion should be obvious: the option for the UK to return to an independent
great power strategy no longer exists. The UK could of course try and return to the
period before its accession to the Union, in 1973, and once again opt for the role of
“deputy sheriff” to the US as its key strategic part. The Brexiteers certainly like to play
up the “special relationship”. But is the US itself still interested in having a country as
a deputy that has lost so much power?
Suppose the US fights a limited war. Then it doesn’t need the UK, except maybe for
political reasons. American military might is such that it can project its power
anywhere in the world without the help of allies and partners. Whereas if the US
were to fight a truly major war, with China for example, the UK has become too small
to make much of a difference. The UK was much more important to the US as a
Member State of the EU, in order to ensure that the EU would not diverge too far
from Washington’s guidelines. That part the UK has always played excellently well,
notably by continuously putting obstacles in the way of autonomous structures for
European defence. That’s one of the main reasons why the EU still has but very
limited command and control capacity within its structures, and why the European
Defence Agency (EDA) never received the budget it would have needed to really play
the role it was intended to. The UK also has always been the greatest proponent of
Turkish accession to the EU, and of EU enlargement in general. In the strategic
debate on whether the EU should be deepened first (by integrating more) or
widened first (by allowing in more members), the British view has won out – and now
the Brits are leaving. Thus Washington loses its closest ally within the EU. And the UK
loses a lot of its interest for the US.
Unless, that is, a British government would join forces with President Donald Trump,
who has welcomed Brexit, to actively undermine the EU. The UK could attempt to
sabotage collective EU decision-making through bilateral deals with individual
Member States. Perhaps this is what some Brexiteers are dreaming of, just like some5
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state is being dismantled, a tax cut massively favours the rich and undermines the
future functioning of government, and the state does less and less to assist those
who are worst off. Probably not exactly what most of those who voted for Brexit had
in mind.
But such an anti-EU policy would be very risky, for it would be directly at odds with
British interests. It would also go against centuries of British grand strategy, which
has always considered a divided but stable European continent to be a precondition
for a stable UK. Britain could only focus on its global role and the Empire as long as it
was not in any way directly threatened in Europe. Therefore it regularly intervened
on the continent, and often played the decisive part in restoring the European
balance of power, from the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) to World War
Two. The need for a strong EU may understandably appear counter-intuitive to many
British, because in the past restoring the balance of power always meant preventing
a single great power from dominating the continent of Europe. But the EU is unique,
because it is of course a voluntary coming together of states that choose to pool their
sovereignty, rather than the subjugation of Europe by a single state, as Louis XIV,
Napoleon, Wilhelm II, and Hitler have attempted. Today it is precisely the unravelling
of the EU that could once again lead to war in Europe, in which sooner or later the
UK would inevitably be involved. For the first time in history, a (voluntarily) united
Europe serves the British interest better than a balance of power between individual
European states.
By choosing to leave the EU, the UK may paradoxically have become more useful to
the EU than to the US. To the extent that the “special relationship” endures and the
UK has more influence in Washington than any other European country, the UK could
perhaps play a part in moderating some of the more eccentric of Trump’s views on
Europe and the world. The attempt would certainly be worthwhile, for British inter-
ests often coincide much more with EU interests than with those of the Trump
administration. But does Trump really listen to anybody who doesn’t agree with him
in the first place? As long as he remains president, a “special relationship” may be an
illusion, sadly for both the UK and the EU.6
OUT OF THE EU, BUT IN NATO
In addition to emphasising the importance of the “Anglosphere” and the “special
relationship” with the US, the Brexiteers always stress the fact that the UK will of
course remain an Ally in NATO and will continue to play a key role in the security of
Europe. But the UK will soon find out that in NATO as well it will no longer be able to
play its traditional part.
Once Britain effectively leaves the EU, it will at a stroke lose its direct influence on EU
decision-making on security and defence, and thus also most of its influence on
relations between the EU and NATO. After Brexit, London will quickly realise that its
views will no longer automatically be heard in the EU debate. Just like any other third
country, if the UK will want to be heard, it will have to lobby. And those who under-
take demarches only in order to block proposals, have a lot more difficulty in gaining
attention than those who table constructive proposals. Bilateral relations with
individual EU Member States will obviously remain, not in the least with France and
Germany. But EU decision-making has its own dynamic. In the end one is a part of it
– or not.
In this regard too, the UK is therefore set to lose a lot of its usefulness to the US.
Brexit will affect Britain’s standing in the Alliance. This may have an impact on the
posts that Britain holds. Currently, NATO’s military number two, Deputy SACEUR, is
always a British general. It is already being debated whether this has not to change,
because Deputy SACEUR is automatically in command when an EU military operation
has recourse to NATO command and control. Should not that officer therefore come
from an EU Member State?
Most importantly, as long as it exists, the political centre of gravity of Europe is, and
will remain, the EU, not NATO. And the EU will carry on, with or without the UK. As
long as France and Germany seek “ever closer union” (the phrase in the European
treaty that the UK objected to from the start), closer union is what we’ll have. This is
because the Franco-German axis is not just the engine of the EU, but its essence. The
process of European integration was launched precisely to create a reconciliation,
and then a partnership, between France and Germany, in order to prevent a third
world war from ever starting in Europe. In this geopolitical sense, the UK is in the
periphery rather than in the core of the European project, hence the project can
continue without it, while it would tumble the moment France or Germany gave up
on it.
Many in the UK do not seem to understand this and are under the illusion that other
EU Member States will do anything to keep the UK on board. But certainly for the
founding members of the EU, this is about vital interests, so they cannot but priori-
tise the continued existence of the Union. This should have been clear to the UK even7
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Minister David Cameron, the referendum was not given that much attention in
Brussels. It was just generally assumed that the British people would vote the “right”
way. When it became apparent that they might not, and that Brexit was becoming a
real possibility, Brussels quickly came to a conclusion: we’d rather not have Brexit, of
course, but if Brexit it is, we will carry on with the EU. This crucial realisation even
before the outcome of the referendum was known, meant that there was never any
possibility of the Brexiteers’ mirage becoming reality. Not just Brussels and the
founding members, but all Member States have to take a similar stance, because of
the interests at stake: you cannot expect to leave a club yet retain all benefits of
membership, otherwise it would be the end of the EU. You can’t have your cake and
eat it, that the British of all people should know.
Yet many Brexiteers still seem to think that people in Brussels and the other capitals
wake up every morning, and go to bed every night, thinking: how are we going to
solve Brexit? The unsurprising reality is that first on the agenda of the EU is – the EU.
Since the referendum the EU debate has focused on the future of the European
project. Brexit is first and foremost a British problem: the UK has chosen to leave and
must now search for its own path. The EU is absolutely right not to allow Brexit to
dominate its agenda. A team has been appointed to wage negotiations with the UK
on behalf of the Union, so that the EU as such can focus on its own future. That is a
big enough challenge.8
OUT OF THE EU, BUT IN EUROPE
None of this means that there cannot be an enduring close partnership between the
EU and the UK. In the area of defence, this would definitely be in their mutual
interest. The UK accounts for no less than a quarter of the defence expenditure of
the EU-28, and 10% of the total troop numbers. Moreover, excellently trained and
highly experienced British forces constitute a very high share of the relatively small
number of European troops that are actually deployable on expeditionary opera-
tions. The quality of the British defence effort is also reflected in the fact that the UK
spends some €155,000 per soldier as compared to the EU average of €130,000.
Together with France, the UK is the leading military power in Europe. It is very much
in the interest of the EU therefore to ensure that the UK continues to contribute to
the security of Europe.
The British armed forces will not, of course, disappear. When the clock strikes
midnight on the eve of Brexit, British tanks will not change into pumpkins nor frigates
into watermelons. And, come Brexit, Britain will have left the EU, but it will still be in
Europe. Any military threat against Europe will thus also constitute a threat against
the UK. Continuing cooperation in the field of defence is as much in Britain’s as in the
EU’s interest therefore.
This implies that the Brexiteers cannot use the security argument in order to get a
better deal from the EU. Some have made the case that the UK is entitled to better
conditions from the EU because it makes a more than average contribution to NATO.
But this is not how it works. NATO and the EU are separate organisations: one cannot
ask for a discount in one club because one already pays fees into another. Besides,
then the EU should somehow also reward other Member States that have a larger
defence budget than the EU average (such as Greece). The threat of abandonment
cannot work either. The UK can hardly refuse to contribute to European security
since that is still its own security. If a certain threat against Europe requires a military
response, it is still much more likely than not that the UK will be part of that response.
When in a given crisis Europeans engage in combat operations, they increasingly do
so in ad hoc coalitions, outside the formal framework of NATO or the EU. Brexit will
likely reinforce that trend. Of the two key military actors in Europe, one, the UK, will
no longer be a member of the EU, while the other, France, is not going to turn its back
on the EU and channel its entire operational commitment through NATO. At the
same time, troops on other types of operations will of course continue to be
deployed under EU, NATO and UN command.
A practical question therefore is whether, after Brexit, the UK will still be willing to
contribute to EU operations if in a specific contingency the other Europeans opt for
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as framework for deployment. Even9
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3.6% of the total (and 5.8% for the civilian missions). There already is an arrangement
for the participation of non-EU Member States in CSDP operations. Many countries,
from Asia to South America, have contributed ships to the EU’s anti-piracy operation,
Atalanta, for example. London has already made it understood, however, that it
considers this arrangement to be insufficient, as it allows third countries to
contribute capabilities to an operation, but not to be involved in its strategic direc-
tion. (And many other third countries have also expressed their dissatisfaction,
actually). In view of Britain’s military weight in Europe, some sort of special arrange-
ment does seem advisable. But if London wants a special status, it will have to offer
something special, more than other third countries. For example, the UK could
continue to make its operational headquarters in Northwood available to the EU
after Brexit. Only in return for permanent concrete contributions, could structural
involvement in decision-making on CSDP operations be envisaged, for example by
offering the UK a seat – but without voting rights – in the relevant EU bodies.
After Brexit, Britain will continue to participate in European military operations,
under various flags, possibly even that of the EU. It’s a different question, however,
whether the UK will be able to play the same leading role as before in initiating
operations. Until now, it has usually been London and/or Paris that took the initiative
to mount an operation and forge a coalition to that end. But as British decision-
makers will be absorbed by the Brexit negotiations, and the many domestic issues
that Brexit also entails, there will be less and less bandwidth left for strategic initia-
tives. The question for the EU is then whether France alone can play this role, and
whether Germany may gradually grow into it. Because of the country’s history,
German public opinion remains very reticent to see the armed forces deployed
abroad. Nevertheless, Germany has made singular progress. German troops are
deployed in Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali – twenty years ago, that would have been
unimaginable. Berlin will have to play an even stronger leading role in the area of
defence though, if it really wants to strategically underpin European defence
together with Paris.
For the further development of military capabilities in Europe, Brexit will probably
not matter much. If anything, Brexit has in fact had a positive effect, because the
debate on military cooperation and integration in Europe has accelerated since the
referendum. For the wrong reasons: it’s not because of the UK’s departure that the
remaining Member States will miraculously agree on everything. True, the UK has
traditionally vetoed certain initiatives, mostly those having to do with setting up new
structures. A permanent military headquarters for the EU, for example, remains a
red line for the UK, which sees this as a superfluous duplication of NATO. But the UK
never opposed multinational schemes to enhance capabilities through cooperation
and even integration. It most likely would not have participated in most of such
schemes itself, but neither would it have stopped other Member States from doing10
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themselves were always able to hide behind the UK. It was easy to pretend to
support an initiative even if one opposed it in order not to complicate relations with
those that tabled it, if one knew that the British would veto it anyway. After Brexit,
those Member States will have to come clean.
European defence has momentum now, as the activation of Permanent Structured
Cooperation (PESCO) in December 2017 shows. 25 EU Member States have signed up
to binding criteria for their defence effort and have announced around 15 capability
projects to start with. The Commission is ready to support multinational projects
from the EU budget with its new European Defence Fund (EDF). The non-participa-
tion of the UK will not have much of an impact on PESCO’s eventual success, since
nobody expected it to join in the first place. Britain and France were at the origins of
the idea, back in the days of the European Convention and the 2003 Constitutional
Treaty, but London had long lost interest.
Now that PESCO has started, it may have an impact on the UK though. Britain has
never been very keen on big multinational projects or on far-reaching integration,
but it has constructed some very close bilateral military cooperation arrangements.
In 2010 it notably concluded the Lancaster House agreements with France, in the
context of which a Franco-British Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) has
been created. The CJEF is about cooperation to increase interoperability, not integra-
tion to create multinational capabilities; it basically allows a British and a French
brigade to be deployed together. On the British side, the very same forces constitute
the British contribution to a similar scheme with Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden: the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF).
If in the future, however, France, or one of the countries participating in the JEF,
were to effectively integrate some of the capabilities concerned with those of other
countries in the framework of PESCO, then the British in the CJEF or JEF would no
longer just cooperate with a purely national capability but with a multinational
European one. Technically this is perfectly feasible.
At the same time, as the January 2018 Franco-British Summit showed, Brexit need not
prevent bilateral defence cooperation from being deepened. French President
Emmanuel Macron’s European Intervention Initiative even seems to aim at a new
scheme for cooperation on expeditionary operations outside PESCO and the EU, and
could involve the UK. It would be much more advisable for France to pursue this initi-
ative inside PESCO however (where a very similar Crisis Response Operational Core or
CROC is also envisaged), in order to prevent a fragmentation of effort. The UK, like
other third states, cannot take part in the overall decision-making on PESCO, but it
could participate in individual projects, such as the CROC, on a case-by-case basis.
As PESCO and the EDF gather pace, the British defence industry, unlike the British
government, will likely want to join in. If thanks to PESCO and the financial support11
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defence efforts and, in the future, start just a single collective project to build each
of the next generation of major platforms, then these will dominate the European
market. It remains a big if, but if it works out as intended, British firms will have a
major interest in participating in the industrial consortia that will develop and build
Europe’s future arms and equipment. As usual, the British will probably wait and see,
and jump on the wagon only if PESCO and the EDF clearly are successful.
All things considered, Brexit may not affect EU defence policy that much. Brexit does
imply that the UK will no longer contribute to the EU budget, including the EDF, nor
to the EDA. Either the other Member States compensate by increasing their own
contribution, or budgets from other lines will have to be reallocated to defence.
Brexit will also mean that many British staff will leave the EU institutions. British
citizens who have permanent appointments as EU officials are likely able to stay.
Even so, quite a few are applying for Belgian nationality (who would have thought
that people would feel it’s better to be Belgian than British). However, a third of the
posts in the EEAS, and all posts in the EU Military Staff, are held not by EU officials
but by seconded national diplomats and military officers. From this category, all
British personnel will automatically disappear. It so happens that it’s precisely the UK
that sends many excellent people to the EU. A British general once told me that
among the staff that Member States second to Brussels, there are swimmers,
floaters, and sinkers. In my experience, Brits have always been overrepresented
among the swimmers.12
BUT WHAT ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY?
There seems to be more debate about the colour of future British passports then
about the substance of its foreign policy after Brexit. But even though it is talked about
much less than defence policy, it looks a lot more complicated to keep the UK involved
in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). That there is a mutual interest
in this area, too, is evident. The UK is an important diplomatic actor. Any EU position
to which the UK also subscribes and that its extensive diplomatic network and experi-
enced diplomats can support, will carry a lot more weight. If the EU were to adopt
economic sanctions against a third country, any divergence between EU and UK
sanctions regimes would only be to the profit of the targeted state.
Vice versa, there is not that much space for an independent British foreign policy
outside the EU framework. The UK may be able to exercise significant influence on
some specific issues or individual countries with which it has special ties. But what
impact do the Brexiteers think the UK on its own will have on the major issues of
world politics: the Ukraine crisis, the wars in the Middle East, the rise of China? The
UK alone, just like any other European country, no longer has sufficient power to
aspire to significantly influence any of these.
Imagine that on a major issue, the EU adopts a clear-cut common position, enters
into a dialogue with the US, and that Brussels and Washington coordinate their views
and take joint action. What will the UK do – the opposite? On the big issues, London’s
margin for manoeuvre will be limited to the choice between joining EU and US
action, or simply not doing anything at all. If the EU and the US adopt opposing points
of view, which, with Trump in the White House, is not unlikely, London will be in an
even more uncomfortable position, forced to choose between the one and the other
or, again, to remain inactive. This is happening already: in reaction to Trump putting
in doubt the nuclear agreement with Iran, the UK sided with France, Germany and
the EU to stress its importance. The conclusion is obvious: the UK would do well to
seek a close partnership with the EU in foreign policy as well as defence.
There is as yet no arrangement for involving third countries in EU foreign policy.
Certain countries, notably candidates for accession, subscribe to EU positions on a
nearly systematic basis, but they don’t really participate in EU decision-making.
Moreover, this mechanism mostly concerns diplomatic statements and rarely the
operational decisions on election observation, sanctions, civilian missions, or military
operations. One can certainly imagine pragmatic solutions. The EU could allow the
UK to maintain its seat on the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and all preparatory
bodies, but without voting rights. In this manner, London could contribute its views
to the EU decision-making process from the start, instead of just being able to choose
whether or not to subscribe to an EU decision at the end of the process. Such an
arrangement would certainly benefit the quality of EU foreign policy.13
A NEW “SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP”?
Arrangements to continue to involve the UK in CFSP and CSDP post-Brexit, and, of
course, continued consultation through NATO, could amount to an EU-UK strategic
partnership – a new “special relationship”, as it were.
Unfortunately, it is far from certain that all concerned will be sufficiently pragmatic
to agree on workable solutions. On the EU side, no matter how unjustified, the fact
is that there exists in many corners a certain revanchist attitude: the idea that the
British deserve to be punished. They will have to beg for it, on their bare knees, was
how a general from another Member State reacted when I first vented my idea to
maintain a British seat in the FAC. Another general, not without reason, warned
against repeating the experience of the now defunct Western European Union
(WEU), which in the end had so many associate members, associate partners, and
observers, that the actual full members lost their autonomy of decision-making.
A EU-UK partnership will have to be clearly defined, therefore. First of all, a Euro-
British “special relationship” must be just that: special. It cannot be seen as a prece-
dent for similar arrangements with any other state (which, for most Member States,
means: with Turkey). That is easy to justify, if necessary: after Brexit, only one non-
EU European state will have a permanent seat on the Security Council, so only that
one state qualifies for this type of strategic partnership.
Second, as the UK has always strongly opposed free-riding, it cannot now do so itself.
A seat in the FAC, even without voting rights, cannot come for free. The CFSP remains
an intergovernmental area of EU policy: decisions require unanimity. In practice,
Member States hardly ever vote in the FAC or its preparatory bodies, but either take
decisions by consensus or don’t decide at all. A seat without a vote thus actually
comes very close to having a normal seat. Therefore, it would be but logical that in
this scenario the UK would continue to abide by all Treaty stipulations on the CFSP,
and continue to pay into the CFSP budget. An “opt-in” into the CFSP cannot be
partial: it would have a very negative impact on decision-making if the UK subscribed
to one EU common position and not to another. Having a seat implies subscribing to
all CFSP decisions, and defending them in all other forums, just like the Member
States.
This would send a strong signal to the other powers, such as Russia and China, that
in diplomacy even after Brexit there will be but one Europe, which would be in the
interest of all European states. The UK would also benefit because it would retain an
important asset in its relationship with the US. And the EU Member States would
benefit because if the UK remains fully involved in the CFSP, they need not fear the
emergence of new parallel circuits that would by-pass the EU. Smaller Member
States especially would not be keen on the UK trying to influence foreign policy from14
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and Germany. At the same time, it would be clear that if one leaves the Union, one
cannot come back in on the cheap, so this would strengthen Brussels’ hand in the
Brexit negotiations.
Third, with regard to the CSDP, British involvement would only concern the EU opera-
tions and missions in which it would take part, and not capability development.
Decisions on capability development will henceforth shift to PESCO, of which the UK
is not a member, but it could contribute to individual projects.15
CONCLUSION: PRAGMATISM VERSUS EMOTION
Both sides stand to gain from a pragmatic partnership. There’s no point in debating
who needs the other more. If we don’t manage to create a EU-UK strategic partner-
ship in foreign policy and defence, both sides will lose – that’s what counts.
The biggest obstacle to such a partnership, however, are the British themselves.
The British government, in Foreign Policy, Defence and Development: A Future
Partnership Paper (September 2017), expressed a very positive view of CFSP and
CSDP. One almost wonders why it would wish to leave. Unfortunately, and contrary
to the British reputation for pragmatism, in the debate on the EU and Brexit
ideology and emotions prevail. That renders it very difficult for the British political
leadership to adopt a nuanced stance. Prime Minister Theresa May’s electoral
defeat in June 2017, against all expectations, demonstrated how volatile British
domestic politics have become. This certainly doesn’t make the Brexit negotiations
any easier.
Not just in foreign and defence policy, but in many other policy areas there are very
good reasons to maintain practical cooperation between the UK and the EU even
after Brexit. Cooperation between police and intelligence services and justice
departments in the fight against terrorism is an obvious example. The problem is
that when every British ministry draws up the list of what it still wants to do with
the EU after Brexit, and London then assembles all those lists, the result will look
very much like membership. That will be politically unfeasible, even though every
individual item on every list will be perfectly logical. This demonstrates the sheer
absurdity of Brexit: after years of negotiating on how to leave, the UK will then
have to start another round of negotiations on how to link back up with the EU in
a whole range of areas.
If the general atmosphere in the negotiations were to turn permanently sour, the
risk is that foreign and security policy will suffer as a consequence, and that none
of the pragmatic solutions on offer will be implemented, to the detriment of both
sides of the Channel. A “hard” Brexit is a definite possibility. At the same time,
there still is a slight chance that in the end Brexit will not happen. Once the negoti-
ations have been concluded and an agreement is on the table, it will most probably
become very clear very quickly that this will not quite bring the golden future that
the Brexiteers promised. By that time the economic impact of Brexit will have
become clearer as well. For now, the impact is limited, because governments and
companies are waiting to learn what the future status of the UK will be. Gradually,
however, the flow of investments to the UK will slacken – nobody is going to
embark on a major investment without knowing whether the UK will remain in the
single market.16
BREXIT, STRATEGY, AND THE EU: BRITAIN TAKES LEAVEPerhaps, if offered the chance to vote again, British citizens will prefer to stay in
the EU after all. Meanwhile, however, the EU itself will (hopefully!) have advanced
and made new steps towards more integration. Even if the UK were to remain,
which personally I strongly hope for, something, sadly, has been broken between
the UK and the rest of the EU.17
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